Microeconomic Theory Seminar: Robust Procurement: Bayesian Design under Worst-Case Approval Constraints

Alessandro Pavan is coming to Wesley W. Posvar Hall on Thursday, October 22, for the Microeconomic Theory Seminar. He's visiting from Northwestern University, and he'll be presenting his work, Robust Procurement: Bayesian Design under Worst-Case Approval Constraints.

If you're not already familiar with the subject, the title gives you a good sense of the ground he's covering. It's a talk on procurement—the way organizations buy goods and services—and how to design those processes using Bayesian methods. The "robust" part of the title is the key: he's looking at how to make those designs hold up even when you're dealing with worst-case approval constraints. It's a deep dive into the mechanics of how contracts and bidding work when you can't be entirely sure how the other side is going to react.

This is part of the Microeconomic Theory Seminar series, so it's geared toward people who follow the field. Pavan is a professor at Northwestern, and this is a chance to hear him walk through the logic of the paper in person rather than just reading it on your own. If you've been following the conversation around robust design or Bayesian mechanisms, this is exactly the kind of thing that usually sparks a good discussion afterward.

The seminar runs from 3:30 PM to 4:45 PM at Wesley W. Posvar Hall, 230 S Bouquet St, in the heart of the University of Pittsburgh campus. It's a Thursday afternoon slot, so it's an easy one to drop into if you're around the university that day.